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The global food price shock of 2006-2008 has particularly affected poorer strata of 
populations in several developing countries. In Egypt and some other countries it has put 
food subsidy schemes to the test. This paper develops two comparable computable general 
equilibrium models for Egypt and Ukraine which are used to simulate direct and indirect 
impacts of the food price surge and various policy options on the performance of the main 
macroeconomic indicators as well as on poverty outcomes. The results illustrate the limited 
ability of realistic policy responses to mitigate negative social consequences of an external 
price shock. Food import tariff cuts are a partial remedy faring better than other analysed 
options. Furthermore, the Egyptian system of food subsidies needs substantial reforms 










In 2006, following almost three decades of stability or decline, real global prices of 
agricultural commodities and food entered a period of growth that lasted till mid-2008. The 
scale of this upturn was not unprecedented, but still quite unusual and one can only quote 
two comparable episodes in recent history: developments during World War II and during 
1973-1974 (Figure 1). The 2006-2008 food price surge coincided with a major increase in oil 
and other energy commodity prices, creating a series of serious macroeconomic and social 
challenges around the world. 
Figure 1. Wheat prices, 1913 – 2010 
 
 
Note: Nominal prices in current USD per tonne: All wheat, U.S. season average price. Prices do not include an 
allowance for outstanding loans and government purchases. Real prices (average 2000 level = 100) are deflated 
by the US All Urban Consumers Price index (CPI-U) - U.S. city average. 
Sources: USDA, World Agricultural Outlook Board, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates and 
calculations based on U.S. Department of Labor.  
 
The economies of several low- and lower-middle-income countries have been strongly hit 
and lower income strata of the population have been seriously affected. The poverty impact 
of such a major price surge can indeed be highly significant. In Egypt for example, food 
expenditures account for over 60% or even 70% of the poorest households’ budgets. Good 
understanding of the poverty impact of such a major external shock is in itself a highly 
relevant policy question. 
                                                       






These recent developments have added a new perspective to the on-going discussion on the 
potential reforms of the large food subsidy programme in Egypt (and in some other Middle 
East and North African countries) that over the years has created a partly effective, although 
poorly targeted social safety net, which has also increasingly drained budgetary resources. 
The external food price shock has put the existing systems to the test.  
 
While the 2006-2008 food price surge has partly reversed and its short- and medium-term 
macroeconomic consequences have been overshadowed by the global financial and 
economic crises that strongly affected the analysed economies, the issue of formulating 
appropriate agricultural and food policies remains topical. This is because the medium- and 
long-term outlook for global food prices remains uncertain and scenarios foreseeing a more 
permanent price shift of some basic commodities to a higher level cannot be excluded. 
 
In view of the above this paper analyses the currently applied policy regimes and different 
feasible food policy schemes in two countries – Egypt and Ukraine – selected on the basis of 
some important common characteristics and at the same time important differences with 
regard to their agricultural/food policies. The focus is on alternative policy options and the 
extent to which they can mitigate the developmental, macroeconomic and poverty effects of 
food price shocks. The fiscal sustainability of these alternative policies is also studied.  
 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the food and 
agricultural policies in the two countries are outlined. The third section discusses the role of 
food products in consumption baskets. The fourth section introduces the model, and the two 
subsequent sections present benchmark data and the analysed scenarios. Results of the 
CGE model simulations are discussed in section 7. The concluding part provides a number 
of policy recommendations.  
 





2. Food policies in Egypt and Ukraine 
 
2.1. Food policies – difficult assessment 
 
Food subsidies of different forms play an important role in several countries, both developed 
and developing. In developed countries, the complicated subsidy schemes typically work 
through supporting agricultural production (or land ownership) and systems partly controlling 
the quantity and prices of selected commodities (e.g. sugar or milk in the EU). There are 
numerous controversies surrounding these complicated schemes that have been evolving 
over time. Among important points raised in debates, some claim the importance of ensuing 
foreign trade distortions, in particular what is considered as unfair competition with non-
subsidised domestic agricultural and food production of developing countries (see Bureau 
and Matthews (2005) for discussion). There are also concerns about health outcomes. The 
distribution of subsidies among different groups of food products affects their relative prices 
and hence average consumption patterns. Here, some claim that e.g. increased obesity can 
be partly linked to the concentration of subsidies on meat and dairy products and other highly 




The analysis of effects of various food subsidy and food rationing schemes is complicated as 
the effects often manifest themselves though channels that are difficult to foresee and 
monitor. Such schemes lead to changes in relative prices and in accessibility of different food 
products to particular consumers and/or also food production patterns.  
 
One surprising result concerns the outcome of the food-rationing systems that were 
introduced in the UK and Australia during WWII. Food rationing covered several food items 
and its main motivation was to ensure sufficient nutritional intake for the whole population 
and preventing surges in food prices in view of much limited food import options (in the case 
of the UK) and food requirements related to the war effort (in the case of Australia). In both 
countries the rationing system was supported by campaigns promoting home-food 
production, e.g. growing one’s own vegetables. The general health outcome of the rationing 
                                                       





system was rather positive with a decline in diet related problems like obesity, diabetes and 
heart disease and e.g. birth of healthier and larger babies than before the rationing system 
was introduced (Brown, 1991)
3. Another example of surprising results of changes in food 
policies concerns the cut in subsidies for diary and animal products containing high levels of 
saturated fats that was introduced in Poland in 1991. Zatonski and Willet (2005) claim to 
have found a significant drop in deaths from coronary heart disease that can be attributed to 
this policy change. Their result is not uncontested, e.g. Ravnskov (2005) questions the 
existence of evidence for the causal link between fat intake and coronary disease. 
 
Summing up, the main point here is that any policies affecting the availability of certain food 
products for certain categories of consumers may have consequences that are far-reaching 
and difficult to predict, often going beyond purely economic effects. 
 
2.2. Egypt: Overview of selected food and agricultural policies 
 
2.2.1. Consumer food subsidies  
 
Prices of many goods and services are subsidized in Egypt to make basic needs affordable 
to consumers. By providing citizens with a minimum level of food at subsidized prices, the 
government aims to protect them from malnutrition and helps them cope with 
individual/household food insecurity. 
 
Food subsidies are provided through two main channels: a universal subsidy for baladi bread 
(local Egyptian wheat bread) available to every citizen with no quota restrictions and ration 
cards which offer eligible households a pre-determined monthly allowance of basic foodstuffs 
(including rice, sugar and edible oil) for a maximum of four persons registered on each card
4. 
 
Dramatic rises in global food prices after mid-2006 have increased the fiscal cost of food 
subsidy ratio to GDP from 1.5 percent in 2006/07 to 1.8 percent in 2007/08 (Table 1). Part of 
                                                       
3 For additional information on the rationing systems including the home-food production advertisements see e.g. 
http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-food/rationing.htm, http://www.woodlands-
junior.kent.sch.uk/Homework/war/rationing.htm.  
4 Ration cards beneficiaries include pensioners; government employees; public sector workers; casual workers; 
business sector workers whose salaries do not exceed LE 1000 per month; widows; people who are divorced and 





this increase was due to rising ration quantities and the expansion of ration cards coverage. 
This already signals that food subsidies could become a major fiscal problem if food prices 
stay high or in the event of future price shocks. 
 
Table 1. Food subsidies in Egypt, 2005/06 - 2009/10 (% of GDP) 










Percent  of  GDP  1.5 1.3 1.8 2.1 1.3 
 
Note: The data are presented for the fiscal operations of the budget sector (comprising central government, local 
governments and some public authorities), on a cash basis consistent with the Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS) 2001 classification. 
Sources: IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2008 Article IV Consultation- Staff Report, IMF Country Report NO. 09/25, 
January 2009 and Ministry of Finance, Egypt: Briefing on the recent wage and subsidies increases and offsetting 
budgetary measures, June 2008. 
 
From a fiscal perspective, baladi bread subsidy is the most important, accounting for nearly 
79 percent of the total subsidy bill as of 2007/08. Ration cards critically affect consumption of 
selected food items of the poorest households accounting for 60 percent of their 
consumption of sugar, 73 percent for oil, and 40 percent for rice (WFP, 2008). 
 
In response to soaring food prices, in 2008 the government decided to update the 
registration for the food subsidy program to allow people born after 1989 to be registered in 
the system of ration cards. An extra 22 million people were added, expanding the coverage 
of the ration card subsidy system to nearly 69.2 million beneficiaries by November 2008. In 
addition, the quantities of subsidized food items for all ration cards were increased. As of 
November 2008, ration cards supplied additional quantities of rice, sugar and vegetable oil, 
at prices well below their market value, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Ration scale of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) as of November 2008 
Commodity Ration  type  Allowance: kg per person 
per month  
Price of rationed food as a % of 
market price 
Rice Uniform  1.3  24 
Base ration  1.0  15  Sugar 
Additional ration  0.66  52 
Base ration  0.5  9  Vegetable oil 
Additional ration  0.66  40 
Source: WFP (2008). 
 
Despite the long-standing provision of in-kind food subsidies in Egypt and the expansion of 
the overall coverage of the food subsidy program over the past years, poverty remains high 
and a large proportion of people remain highly vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition. 





parity (PPP) adjusted terms compared to less than 10 percent of the population in Jordan. 
Similarly, the prevalence of malnutrition among children is more than double the level 
observed in Jordan and Tunisia (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Subsidies and transfers spending and indicators for Egypt and selected 
countries 
Country Per  capita 
subsidies and 
transfers 
spending (in US$ 
PPP adjusted) 
GINI coefficient  Malnutrition 
prevalence 
(weight, percent 




at $2 a day 
(PPP) (in percent 
of population) 
Egypt  230.4  34.4  8.6  43.9 
Jordan 145.4  38.8  4.4  7.0 
Morocco  40.0 39.5 10.2 14.3 
Tunisia 184.1  39.8  4.0  6.6 
 
Note: Malnutrition is estimated based on the percentage of children under the age of five who are underweight for 
their age group. 
Source: IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: Selected Issues - IMF Country Report NO. 07/381. 
 
Egyptian food subsidies are poorly targeted and unnecessarily expensive, resulting in 
substantial leakage of resources to high-income households. Recent evidence reveals that 
between one-quarter and one-third of the poor do not benefit from food subsidies, and 83 
percent of the value of these subsidies goes to the non-poor (World Bank, 2009a). 
 
A quarter of highly vulnerable households are excluded from participating in the ration card 
system. This may be attributed to the fact that highly vulnerable households who work in the 
informal sector and are illiterate do not have the valid credentials needed to apply for ration 
cards such as an identity document and permanent housing (World Bank, 2009a). 
 
Despite the regulations ensuring punishment for any violation in baladi bread specifications, 
weight, or use of flour outside the legitimate purpose, it is estimated that more than half a 
million tons of subsidized flour is smuggled and sold on the black market or lost, and baladi 
bread is often used as animal feed (Helmy, 2005). 
 
2.2.2. Policies affecting agricultural producers 
 
To bolster national production of strategic crops the Egyptian government offers farmers 
guaranteed prices for wheat, maize, sugar cane, sugar beet and cotton. The prices are being 
adjusted reflecting international and domestic market conditions. For example, faced with 





buy-in price paid to Egyptian farmers for wheat between 2006/2007 and 2007/08. The 
government maintains a procurement program for sugar cane and sugar beet. The delivery 
price for these products was also increased between 2007/2008 and 2008/09. 
 
Despite government efforts to increase guaranteed prices for strategic crops, they remain 
low relative to productions costs. In addition, guaranteed prices are not set in line with the 
profitability of competing crops and a delay in announcing them before the due date for 
cultivating crops results in an ineffective pricing policy. A consistent, transparent and 
effective pricing policy for key staples, including a well-defined floor price for wheat and 
maize (possibly with regional differentiation) could play a central role for national food 
security and for maintaining a certain level of price stability. In times when international 
prices fall below domestic floor prices (e.g. for wheat), imported wheat could be taxed (e.g. 
through tariffs). 
 
To lower agricultural production costs, some inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides 
are subsidized. However, government ownership of most fertilizer factories and the 
distribution of fertilizers through the Egypt’s Principal Bank for Agricultural Development and 
Credit (PBDAC) hamper the development of a competitive market and result in fertilizers’ 
prices being sometimes 40 percent above world market levels (Industrial Modernization 
Center, 2007). Recent bans on urea and nitrogen used for “fertigation” (the application of 
fertilizers through an irrigation system) are hampering access to key fertilizers and 
pesticides. The price of nitrogen fertilizers increased by close to 50% between 2006/07 and 
2007/08 and continued to rise in a more recent period. 
 
Notwithstanding government efforts to stimulate domestic food production, subsidies to 
farmers remain modest and well below levels allowed under the World Trade Organization 
commitments. Egypt’s Producer Support Estimate is very low (2 percent), when compared to 
OECD countries, China or Brazil (Table 4). 





Table 4. Producer support estimate in Egypt and in selected countries (%, 2007) 
 
Country/region   Producer Support Estimate (%) 






Note: Producer Support Estimate is gross annual monetary values to support agriculture producers, expressed as 
a percentage of gross farm receipts. 
OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PSE_2009) provides different values for OECD 
average and Mexico – 2007 levels are estimated at 22.5% and 13.6%, respectively. 
Source: Industrial Modernization Center (2007). 
 
Seen from a different perspective, only 1 percent of the total government subsidy bill in Egypt 
is transferred to farmers. PBDAC offers favourable terms and low interest rates in soft loans 
to farmers and the treasury incurs the burden of the interest rate differential. 
 
The food and agricultural products price surge of 2006-2008 has led to several policy 
responses. To secure food supply, reduce its price in the domestic market and provide some 
relief to consumers, tariffs on food imports were either eliminated (e.g. for rice, oil, some milk 
and cheese products and sugar) or reduced (e.g. for other milk, cheese and butter products) 
and rice exports were banned, starting from April 2008. 
 
In February 2007, the government applied reductions in import duties on 1,114 items, 
including foodstuffs. The changes reduced the weighted average applied tariffs from 20.1 
percent to 16.7 percent. The maximum tariff rate for most imports was reduced from a high of 
40 percent to 30 percent. In April 2008, a presidential decree introduced further reductions to 
customs tariff for several imported products including butter, dairy spreads, cheese and milk 
for nursing infants. Rice and soybean oil became exempt from custom tariffs. 
  
To secure rice supply and reduce its price in the domestic market, the government decided 
to halt rice exports, starting in April 2008. In the days leading up to the decision, prices for 
milled rice reached about USD 450 per tonne, compared to about USD 750 per tonne at the 
beginning of the export season in October 2007. The decision to suspend exports had an 
immediate impact on prices, with rough rice prices dropping almost USD 100 per tonne to 
USD 330 on the local market (USDA 2008 and 2009). 
 





2.3. Ukraine: Overview of selected food and agricultural policies 
 
2.3.1 Direct food subsidies 
 
There are no direct food subsidies determined by the government in Ukraine. However, it is 
within the local authorities' competence to provide bread subsidies and/or ensure availability 
of the so-called “mass consumption” bread at low prices. 
 
The term mass consumption bread refers to popular kinds of wheat or wheat-and-rye bread 
produced by basic recipe. Kinds and prices of mass consumption bread may differ between 
regions. The prices largely depend on the subsidies provided by the local authorities. Mass 
consumption bread is often referred to as the "social bread" as well, implying that it should be 
affordable also for the poorest. However, not only the poorest may buy the "social bread". In 
fact, mass production bread accounts for around 75% of all bread produced in the country. 
 
Local authorities regulate prices for mass consumption bread either by directly setting them 
(e.g. in Kyiv, Odessa, Crimea) or determining profit margins for bakeries, with the latter being 
a prevalent practice. The policies may also set profit margins for flour production to keep 
input costs down for bakeries. Profit margins determined by regional state administrations 
typically range from 5% to 10%, with the lower limit being more common. However, in some 
cases profit margins may be reduced to 2% or so. The prices for mass consumption bread 
set directly by local authorities are often lower than the costs of bread production. To 
compensate for losses incurred by bakeries, local administrations subsidise them.  
 
In addition to reducing incentives for bread production and making bakeries unprofitable, 
tight regulation of bread prices fails to effectively protect the poorest. In some regions, the 
"social bread" produced may not reach the poorest due to limited supply.  
 
One can also mention other income-support programs that are not directly related to food 
subsidies but that help to identify the poor and may serve as a basis for food subsidy 
schemes introduced locally. These programs include: 
 
(1) benefits to low-income families; 
(2) single mothers' allowances;  





(4) benefits to the disabled, and; 
(5) benefits to persons with low incomes taking care of the disabled.  
 
2.3.2 Support for agricultural production 
 
In 2008, the state budget direct expenditures on the agricultural sector amounted to UAH 9.5 
billion. Moreover, at least UAH 14.6 billion was granted to agricultural producers due to the 
special tax regime, in particular VAT exemptions and the fixed agricultural tax (FAT). The 
total agricultural support reached at least 2.5% of GDP in 2008. With its 6.7% share of GDP, 
agriculture is the most supported sector of Ukraine's economy. The main types of support are 
described below. 
 
The fixed agricultural tax 
To minimize the tax burden on agricultural producers the fixed agricultural tax (FAT) was 
introduced in 1999. The FAT is a single tax paid in lieu of a number of taxes and fees, such 
as enterprise profit tax, land tax (fee), communal tax, and some others. Moreover, FAT 
payers are also subject to the privileged pension regime, with the difference between 
standard and privileged payroll tax rate being compensated from the state budget. 
 
The FAT base is the area of agricultural lands in use (or the area of lakes, ponds and water 
reservoirs used for fishing), and its rates are quite low. In 2008, 82% of agricultural 
enterprises declared profits totalling UAH 6.9 billion. Should agricultural producers be taxed 
on a general basis, they would have paid UAH 1.7 billion in corporate profit tax only. Instead, 
they paid only UAH 129 million in FAT. Moreover, the budget compensation to the Pension 
Fund on behalf of the FAT payers amounted to UAH 1.2 billion, i.e. around 12% of total 
budget expenditures on agriculture. 
 
VAT exemptions 
The government provides indirect support to agricultural producers through a special VAT 
regime. During 1999–2008, the sales of livestock and milk by agricultural producers for 
processing were taxed at a zero VAT rate. The VAT accrued by processing plants after 
processing of this production was used to subsidize agricultural producers instead of being 
paid to the budget. At the same time, middlemen were not eligible for subsidies, and in this 
case the processing plants paid VAT to the budget. To meet requirements of the WTO, in 





processing plants were cancelled. 
 
However, farms and agricultural enterprises are still exempt from VAT; they accrue this tax, 
but are allowed to keep it to replenish their working capital. Up to 2008, VAT exemptions 
made up the largest part of support to agricultural producers. 
  
Partial compensation for interest rates on bank loans 
The government provides partial compensation for interest rates on bank loans for 
agricultural and fishery producers, sugar refineries, other processing plants (on loans for 
purchasing agricultural production), agricultural enterprises affected by unfavourable weather 
conditions, etc. Interest compensation is granted on a competitive basis. The conditions 
include good credit track record, implementation of innovations in the production and 
investments in expanding livestock-breeding or purchase of domestically produced farm 
equipment. The level of compensations has varied for the last few years, fluctuating in the 
range of 6-12 percentage points. In response to the financial crisis, the public resources 
available for this form of support have been limited. 
 
Livestock and crop subsidies 
Apart from providing VAT exemptions for agricultural producers, the government directly 
subsidizes livestock. The list is quite long and includes e.g. subsidies for raised and sold 
cattle and poultry, paid to both enterprises and farmsteads, to certified producers of organic 
milk, to beekeepers, subsidies for farms increasing their cow headcount by purchasing or 
breeding pedigree animals, etc. There are also subsidies for crops based on the area sown 
with wheat, triticale, rye, oats, peas, buckwheat, millet, soybean, rice, sugar beets, long-
fibred flax and hemp. 
  
Sugar market regulation 
The state subsidizes domestic beet sugar production. There are several goals behind this 
regulation: (1) to supply domestic demand for sugar: sugar is considered a strategic 
commodity as a great number of other industries depend on it; (2) to maintain jobs: in some 
areas, a sugar refinery is virtually the only local employer; and (3) to ensure the profitability of 
sugar beet and sugar production. To control the sugar market, the government has 
undertaken a number of measures including quotas for sugar deliveries to the internal 
market, minimum prices for sugar and sugar beet, subsidies for sugar beet production. 






In addition, there are restrictions on trade in sugar within the CIS free trade area: mutual 
restrictions on refined sugar with Russia, the exclusion of sugar from free trade with 
Uzbekistan, and the exclusion of sugar and sugar syrups from the free trade regime with 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Russia. 
 
 
2.3.3 Policy response to the 2006-2008 price surge 
 
Grain export restrictions 
Following the experience of 2006, when grain export quotas were first introduced, in summer 
2007 grain exports were again restricted. Given expectations of a small grain harvest due to 
a widespread draught, the government set quotas for exports of wheat, rye, maize and barley 
at 3,000 tonnes for each crop, the small quota size being effectively a ban on exports.  
 
This quota was used up within 30 days. The government subsequently got involved in a 
series of extensions/changes in the quota system until May 2008, when grain export quotas 
were abolished. The quotas are believed to have slowed down the surge of domestic prices. 
At the same time, these restrictions led to about USD 2 billion foregone farm revenues and 
grain traders leaving the market (World Bank, 2008). According to data from the international 
Grain and Feed Trade Association, there were around 1,000 grain traders in Ukraine at the 
start of 2008, half the figure from the previous year. Small-scale traders mostly left the 
market. 
 
Oilseed exports restrictions 
In March 2008, in view of the sharp rise in prices for oil, the Cabinet of Ministers instituted 
quotas on exports of sunflower oil and seed valid until 1st July 2008. Exports were limited to 
300,000 tonnes of oil and 1,000 tonnes of seed. Institution of the quotas restricted sunflower 
oil prices growth. Over April–June 2008, internal sunflower oil prices had been declining 
despite their sharp growth on the world markets. Producers of sunflower oil reacted 
negatively to the application of export restrictions. Some of them curtailed sunflower oil 
production. The quotas were abolished in late May 2008, as sunflower oil production was 
expected to be 4 to 5 times higher than internal consumption. 
 
Efforts to retain price growth through interventions by Derzhrezerv 





using interventions by Derzhrezerv, the state reserves committee. In particular, 
Rezurspostach, a state enterprise, imported beef and pork from Poland, and Derzhrezerv 
was selling the imported meat on the domestic market at a loss that was to be compensated 
by subsidies.  
 
Despite the interventions, prices for meat and meat products continued to grow due to the 
high demand. Worse yet, the distribution of imported meat without proper tenders set uneven 
conditions on the meat packing market and fostered corruption. 
 
Other anti-inflationary measures 
In March 2008, the government, food processing companies and owners of retail chains 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding capping price mark-up at 12% for a list of 32 
products, including flour, bread and baked goods, noodles, grits, rice, beef, pork, poultry, 
cooked sausages, milk and milk culture products, creamery butter, eggs, sugar, sunflower 
oil, and vegetables. The signing of the memorandum did not affect price trends, as it was not 
mandatory for all retail traders to comply with the Memorandum, and no negative 
consequences for failing to obey the rules were presupposed. 
 
Attempts to reform the bread subsidy schemes 
The bread subsidy scheme run by local authorities also came under pressure with surging 
grain and flour prices. This motivated attempts for reforms that at the same time tried to 
address the underlying problem of limited efficiency of the scheme. The solutions assumed 
much better targeted mechanisms. For example, in Kyiv bread prices almost doubled in the 
summer 2008 after remaining unchanged since 2006. To alleviate the effects of increased 
bread prices for the poorest, Kyiv authorities launched a program of targeted assistance, 
paying UAH 15 (USD 2-3) monthly to every person with low incomes. The scheme was 
available to around 450,000 persons. However, already in December 2008, faced with 
deteriorating city finances the Kyiv authorities were forced to stop the scheme. 
 
In Odessa, the local authorities subsidised limited amounts of bread, but it often did not 
reach the poorest. In June 2008, the authorities switched to a scheme in which people under 
a certain income level were granted a social card. The cards provide discount for bread 
purchased at supermarkets and other outlets where special card-readers are installed. The 
cards entitle buyers to get a discount for up to 10 loaves of bread per month. 











Egypt and Ukraine differ quite significantly as regards the balance of domestic production, 
consumption and foreign trade in agricultural and food products. Egypt relies on food imports 
for at least 50 percent of domestic consumption and food accounts for more than 15 percent 
of all imports. Agricultural and food imports of Egypt accounted to roughly one third of 
exports during 2005-2007. Self-sufficiency rates are estimated at 54 percent for wheat, 53 
percent for maize and 77 percent for sugar. Egypt is the second largest importer of wheat in 
the world, the fourth largest importer of vegetable oils and the fifth largest importer of maize 
(National Democratic Party, 2008). 
 
Every year, Egypt consumes over 14 million tonnes of wheat and grows nearly 7 million 
tonnes. This means Egypt imports at least 7 million tonnes per year (Baker and Maitra 2008). 
The country has a wheat consumption per capita which is one of the world’s highest – 196 
kilograms in 2008 (FAPRI 2009). In 2006, the average daily caloric intake per capita in Egypt 
was estimated at 4439, much higher than the world average of 2600 (UNDP, 2008). Egypt is 
projected to remain a net cereal importer until 2030 and beyond, increasing its cereal imports 
by 137 percent compared to 2000 levels. The primary driver of increasing net cereal imports 
is population growth, with income growth playing a smaller role (IFPRI 2008 and FAO 2008). 
 
The situation in Ukraine is markedly different. Close to 90% of food consumed in the country 
is domestically produced. Ukraine ranked among the top five global exporters of wheat and 
coarse grains and corn in 2008/2009 (but in 2007/2008 exports were much smaller) 
(WASDE, 2010). From the perspective of poverty analysis it is also important to note the 
substantial role of subsistence agriculture. As discussed in more detail by Piętka-Kosińska 
(2009), 2008 survey data indicate that 57% of the population lives on farmsteads, working 
their land. The land plots are typically very small with around half of them not exceeding 0.5 
hectares. 
 
During the years of economic growth, the share of foodstuffs in the total consumption 





The shares of bread, oils and fats, sugar and confectionery have been declining while the 
shares of meat, fish, fruit and vegetables have grown. The most significant change in the 
food basket structure was observed for the households of the first and the second income 
deciles. During 2004–2007, the share of meat in their consumption expanded, respectively 
by 6.6 percentage points (pp) and 5pp to 19.3% and 21.2%. Fish consumption grew 1.8pp 
and 1.5pp to 5.8% and 6.1%. This was accompanied by a decline in the share of bread 
consumption from 22.9% to 14.9% for the first decile and from 20% to 13.9% for the second 
decile. 
 
According to the Ukrainian SNA statistics, in 2008, food consumption accounted for about 
38% of total consumption. A steady decline of food share in total consumption from 49.2% in 









Two comparable CGE (computable general equilibrium) models are developed for Egypt and 
Ukraine to examine the short run equilibrium effects of the global food price shock along with 
a set of alternative policy options. The model simulates the direct and indirect impacts of the 
food price surge and the various policy options on the performance of the main 
macroeconomic indicators including economic growth, inflation rate, current account balance, 
trade balance, budget deficit and unemployment rate. The model sectoral coverage and level 
of households’ disaggregation allow for analyzing the effects of policies on sectoral output 
growth rates as well as on the welfare level of households. 
The core model for Egypt is neoclassical; however, it includes some structuralist features 
that depart from the Walrasian paradigm providing a better representation of the Egyptian 
economy. The model is characterized by its detailed treatment of households differentiating 
between rural and urban where each is classified into five different income quintiles. Given 
the purpose of the study, special focus is given to food subsidies where separate sectors are 
classified for subsidized food products differentiating between unrationed products, bread 
and flour, and rationed ones (sugar, edible oil, and rice) as well as a separate subsidy 





and commodities (import subsidies). In addition, the model accounts for detailed treatment 
for various types of taxes including direct and indirect taxes (a detailed description of this 
model is available in Annex 1).  
For Ukraine we employ a small open economy static IFPRI (International Food Policy 
Research Institute) CGE model developed by Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002). The 
major differences with respect to the Egyptian model are the lack of specific treatment of 
subsidized products since there are no significant direct food subsidies in Ukraine as well as 
a different macro closure in relation to the exchange rate.  
 
In the IFPRI model each producer maximizes profits subject to a production technology, 
which at the top of the nest is specified by a Leontief function of the quantities of value added 
and aggregate intermediate input (i.e. value added and aggregate intermediate input are 
used in fixed proportion). In turn value added is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
function of various primary factors, while aggregate intermediate input is a Leontief function 
of disaggregated intermediate inputs. Each activity uses a set of factors up to the point where 
their marginal revenue products equal its price.  
 
The model distinguishes between three factors of production: labour, capital and land. Land 
and capital are fully mobile across sectors and are assumed to be fully employed. On the 
other hand, we allow for the presence of unemployment in the labour market, labour is 
mobile across sectors and its supply is flexible at the benchmark fixed real wage. Household 
consumption is allocated to different commodities based on the linear expenditure system 
(LES) demand functions. Households use their income to pay taxes, save, consume and 
make transfers to other institutions (government, enterprises, rest of the world – ROW). The 
government collects taxes and receives transfers from other institutions. It uses this income 
to purchase goods and services and to make transfers to other institutions. Throughout the 
simulations we assume that government spending is fixed, all tax rates are fixed, while 
government savings are a flexible residual post. The final institution is the rest of the world 
which supplies imports and purchases exports. Transfers between the ROW and domestic 
institutions are fixed in foreign currency. Foreign savings (or the current account deficit) is the 
difference between foreign currency spending and receipts. Throughout the simulations we 
keep the trade balance constant, while the real exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate
5. We 
                                                       
5 This assumption differs from the Egyptian model. Despite being relatively stable at around UAH 5/USD between 
April 2005 and October 2008, the hryvnia lost one-third of its value by the end of 2008 and subsequently 





also assume a savings-driven “neoclassical closure”, where all non-government savings 
rates are fixed. The quantity of each commodity in the investment bundle is adjusted to reach 
the level of investment determined by the level of total savings.  
 
Domestic output consists of several commodities that might be the result of different 
activities. A CES function is used in the aggregation function of these commodities. At the 
next stage the domestic output is allocated between domestic sales and exports based on 
the assumption that at any given aggregate output level the suppliers maximize sales 
revenue subject to imperfect transformability between exports and domestic sales expressed 
by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. We employ the small open 
economy assumption and hence export demand is infinitely elastic. This assumption might 
not be accurate in the case of some commodities like e.g. barley, where Ukraine accounts for 
roughly 10% of world exports and hence might be able to influence world prices. However, 
for the sake of comparability of results across countries and products we keep the small 
country assumption for all products as the poverty implications of releasing this assumption 
are likely to be negligible. 
 
The models allow for the disaggregation of households by deciles taking into account their 
regional distribution (urban versus rural), various income sources and consumption patterns, 
therefore allowing for detailed assessment of poverty implications of any food price rises or 
policy changes.  
 
 
5. Benchmark data 
 
The Egyptian SAM is benchmarked to 2006. An updated input-output table was estimated for 
this year on the basis of the input-output table for 2002/2003, which was constructed at the 
Ministry of State for Economic Development (MOED). It includes 22 sectors, of which 14 
sectors cover agri-food commodities. Three sectors focus on subsidized goods: bread, flour 
and other subsidized food. The SAM includes three factors of production: capital, labour and 
land. It incorporates 13 institutions: 10 households (rural and urban quintiles), companies, 
government and the ROW.  





imports for at least 50 percent of domestic consumption and food accounts for more than 15 
percent of all imports. Egypt suffers agricultural and food trade deficits standing at LE 13.8 
billion and LE 8.7 billion respectively in 2007, reflecting modest export to import ratios for 
agricultural and food items (33 percent and 30 percent, respectively) (Table 5)
6.  
Table 5. Agricultural and food trade balance for Egypt (LE million) 
  2005 2006  2007 
Agricultural trade balance  (8,626)  (8,130)  (13,796) 
Agricultural exports as % of 
imports  38.1 37.7  33 
 Food trade balance  (7,615)  (6,488)  (8,680) 
Food exports as % of imports  28.3  31.1  30.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.  
 
For Ukraine we use a social accounting matrix benchmarked to 2006, constructed for the 
purpose of this study by Veronika Movchan (IET). The SAM focuses on agricultural and food 
products, distinguishing 24 sectors out of which 7 agricultural and 8 food products’ sectors 
(the complete list of sectors can be seen in Table 6). The SAM includes 3 factors of 
production: labour, capital and land. The households are disaggregated into rural and urban 
quintiles allowing for analysis of poverty implications.  
 
In 2006, Ukraine was a net exporter of food and agricultural products. Its major exports 
consisted of other animal products, other crops (e.g. barley, maize), other food products and 
edible oil (Table 6). Similar sectors feature prominently in Ukrainian exports along with meat. 
Ukraine is a net importer of other agricultural products, meat, vegetables and fruit, other food 
products, beverages and tobacco, rice, sugar and bread. In 2006, trade in agricultural and 
food products accounted for 10.6% of total exports and 7.6% of total imports.  
 









                                                       
6 In 2007, there was a significant surge in the value of Egypt’s food imports, which went up by 78 percent 
compared to the 2006 level. Nearly 72 percent of the surge was due to the increase in import prices, while 6 





wheat  1739 858  881  57%
paddy rice  0 5  -5  77%
other crops  4086 611 3475  14%
oil crops  1741 210 1531  17%
vegetables and fruits  732 1192  -460  18%
sugar crops  21 2 19  81%
other agriculture  1075 3910  -2835  1%
meat  1350 3104  -1754  5%
edible oil  4165 1118  3048  6%
other animal products  4671 1158  3512  4%
processed rice  23 249  -226  15%
sugar  325 428  -103  10%
bread  136 195  -59  16%
other food  4396 6735  -2339  2%
beverages & tobacco  2326 2688  -362  7%
Source: SAM for 2006. 
 
To understand the impact of increases in prices of food and agricultural products we need to 
look at their significance to households budgets. For the poorest agricultural households 
expenditures on agricultural and food products can account for as much as 57% of total 
expenditures. On the other hand the richest households spend a much smaller, but still 
significant share of their expenditures on these products (Figure 2). These numbers are 
typical for developing countries. The poorest people tend to spend up to three quarters of 
their income on food (Cranfield, Preckel and Hertel 2007). On the other hand, the incomes of 
rural households could increase as a result of higher commodity prices of goods that they 
produce, but benefits will depend on net sales of these products. 





Figure 2. Ukraine: Household expenditure on agricultural and food products in 2006, 
% share in total expenditure by quintiles 
Panel A. Urban households        Panel B. Rural households 
    









In the case of Ukraine and Egypt we start by analysing two scenarios of price increases. The 
“high” price increase scenario or Scenario 1 assumes that the historical pattern of price 
growth observed between average 2006 levels to the level reached when the prices peaked 
in mid-2008 proves to be permanent. In other words, it describes a situation when the 2006-
2008 price surge is not reversed, with prices remaining at the highest level reached in this 
period. The “moderate” price increase scenario or Scenario 2 corresponds to a (permanent) 
price rise equalling an average increase of food and agricultural product prices over 2006-
2008. 
 
Further, we look at the implications of various policy actions to alleviate the impact of food 
price increases. In the case of Egypt we consider various fiscal and trade policy measures 
such as: 
-  the elimination of all food subsidies and compensating the poor through government 
cash transfers to households in the lowest two expenditure quintiles in both urban 
and rural areas (Scenario 3); 
-  removal of all food subsidies except for baladi bread and compensating the poor 





expenditure quintiles (Scenario 4); 
-  removal of tariffs on non-subsidized food products (Scenario 5); 
-  imposing an export ban on processed rice (Scenario 6). 
 
In the case of Ukraine we look at the implications of two policy actions that the authorities 
could have taken to reduce the impact of the increases in food prices on the poor. The first 
policy experiment involves the imposition of an export ban on the following sectors: wheat, oil 
crops, edible oil products and other crops (Scenario U6). It is a stylized approximation of the 
policy actions taken by the Ukrainian government that imposed export restrictions on wheat, 
rye, maize and barley in late 2007 and on oilseeds in early 2008. The second policy 
experiment (Scenario U5) involves abolition of all import tariffs on agricultural and food 
products. The highest tariffs are imposed on products of which Ukraine is a net exporter. 
However, sizeable tariffs are also imposed on vegetables and fruits, processed rice, bread, 
beverages and tobacco. 
 
Table 7. Policy scenarios for Egypt 
  Strong price increase scenario (Scenario 1)  
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This section reviews the key macroeconomic, poverty and other results of various 
simulations carried out for both countries.  
  
7.1 Macroeconomic implications for Egypt 
 
In both Scenarios 1 and 2 it is assumed that the government will not respond to the global 
food crisis. The two sets of assumptions for food world price growth rates had almost similar 
trend impacts on most variables at the macro and micro levels. However, as could have been 
expected, the impact was more pronounced in magnitude in Scenario 1 (see Table 8). The 
model results indicate that world food price growth would lead to a higher inflation rate at the 
aggregate level (increasing CPI by 6 percentage points). Real household consumption 
declines by 1.8%. Furthermore, the current account balance (CAB) is the most negatively 
affected macro indicator, turning from a surplus in 2006/07 to a deficit in 2008/09 in response 
to the food price hikes in mid-2008. This is mainly attributed to the deterioration of the trade 
balance (or export/import gap) in nominal and real terms (deficit increasing from 4.4% of 





increase (1.8%) as a result of the low elasticity of demand for food imports (Table 8).  
 
Government revenues increase in nominal terms reflecting rising tariff proceeds and indirect 
and direct tax bills. Yet expenditures increase at a higher rate reflecting the rise in 
government consumption and compensation for the losses incurred on subsidized food 
products. As a result, the budget deficit increases by 3.9% in real terms. However, its ratio to 
GDP changes only little (from 5.6% to 5.8%). Compared to the base year 2006/07, GDP at 
factor cost and at market price experiences a slight increase (0.6% and 0.8%, respectively). 
In Scenario 3 after eliminating all food subsidies and compensating the poor through 
government cash transfers to households in the lowest two quintiles in both urban and rural 
areas, the real consumption demand in these households for a number of food products 
increases, e.g. for subsidized bread. Yet due to low consumption share of the poor in most 
products, the real total consumption of all households declines by a further 1.5% relative to 
Scenario 1 with no policy intervention. 
 
Directing higher transfers to the poorest quintiles slightly boosts exports of some agricultural 
and food products. Poorest quintiles increase consumption of commodities which are mostly 
confined to either non-tradable products (like bread) or non-exportable ones (flour and other 
previously subsidized items) and to some extent vegetables and fruits and other crops.  
 
Government transfers as a share of income of the poorest quintiles increase from an average 
of 1.2% to 5.4% and from 0.72% to 4.8% in urban and rural households, respectively, to 
offset the negative impact of subsidy elimination on their real income. Despite this increase in 
transfers, budget deficit shrinks by 12.2% relative to Scenario 1.  
 
When all food subsidies are removed except for baladi bread and the government 
compensates the poor through direct cash transfers to the households in the two poorest 
rural and urban expenditure quintiles (Scenario 4), consumption of baladi bread of the lowest 
two quintiles increases by 3.6%. Government transfers to households rise at a slower rate to 
represent 4% and 3% of poorest quintiles spending in urban and rural areas, respectively, to 
offset the negative impact of subsidy removal on their real expenditure. In this scenario the 
fall of real household consumption is only 0.4% higher than in Scenario 1, while the budget 
deficit falls by 1.9% due to the significant reduction of the subsidy bill. 






Table 8. Egypt: Main macro indicators – real growth rates compared to base year 
under Scenarios 1 and 2 as well as net impact of various policy responses (Scenarios 
3 to 6 in relation to Scenario 1) 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Strong price increase scenario (Scenario 1)  










coupled with various policy responses (results in relation to 
benchmark Scenario 1 with no policy response) 
      Scenario 3:  Scenario 4:  Scenario 5:  Scenario 6: 
      Elimination of 
food subsidies + 




















-89.9 -78.5  82.9  38.2 -5.2  7.4 
Exports   -2.5  -2.5  3.5  1.4  0.0  0.3 
Imports    1.8 1.6  -1.0  -0.8 0.3 0.4 
Export-import 
gap  
31.8  29.6  -31.7  -12.3  2.4  0.9 
Investment   8.2  7.9  -10.5 -5.9  0.1  -3.2 
GDPMP   0.8  0.7  -1.5  -0.5  -0.1  -0.8 
GDPFC    0.6 0.6  -2.6  -0.9 0.0  -0.7 
HH 
consumption  
-1.8  -0.8  -1.5  -0.4  0.2  -0.9 
Government 
revenue  
-3.3 -2.0  4.5  1.4 -0.4  0.3 
Government 
expenditure  
-2.0  -0.8  1.6  0.8  0.1  0.4 
Budget deficit   3.9  4.5  -12.2  -1.9 2.5 1.0 
Unemployment   4.1  -1.6  -4.1  1.1  0.2  -4.9 
Subsidy bill  8.0  7.3  -28.7 -11.8  0.2  -3.5 
 
 
According to the SAM 2006/07, non-subsidized foods are the only food products that have 
positive import tariffs. In line with the arguments raised in the literature, the results indicate 
that trade measures adopted by the government of Egypt (GOE) through elimination of tariffs 
on these food items (Scenario 5) are not expected to contribute significantly in solving the 
problem of increased food prices (Ghoneim 2008). This is attributed to the low initial values 
of tariffs (average non-subsidized food tariff rate was 3.3% in the base year). 





Imports of non-subsidized processed food represented 10% of total imports and 52% of 
agricultural and food imports in the base year. Table 8 shows that the results are close to 
those of Scenario 1 with no policy response. The main differences lie in the current account 
and in the budget deficit and their components. However, it is worth noting that this is the 
only one among analysed scenarios leading to an improvement in average household 
consumption compared to no policy response (Scenario 1), even though this improvement is 
small (see also Figure 3).  
 
Tariff elimination (Scenario 5) results in a higher decline in the current account surplus i.e. an 
additional 5.2% relative to Scenario 1 due to the deterioration in the trade balance. Imports of 
non-subsidized food increase by 24.5% compared to the base year (compared to an 
increase of 22.4% in Scenario 1) in real terms. Further, tariff elimination leads to a higher 
growth rate in the budget deficit – 2.5% relative to Scenario 1 on the back of lower tariff 
revenues. The differences in sectoral consumption are minor. The impact on other macro 
variables such as CPI, investment, GDP and unemployment is very small, i.e. almost no 
change relative to Scenario 1. 
 
Imposing an export ban on processed rice (Scenario 6) could have more tangible effects on 
the economy. Processed rice exports represented 28% of food exports and 1.2% of total 
exports according to the benchmark SAM. The initial impact for this policy is the decline of 
the relative domestic price of processed rice and paddy rice
7. Consequently the relative 
prices for other agricultural and food products increase. This dampens households’ 
consumption – an additional decrease of around 1% relative to Scenario 1 and consequently 
also on the aggregate price level. Relative to Scenario 1, a rice export ban leads to higher 
consumption of rice and a decline in consumption of all other food categories. 
A ban on rice exports leads to lower budget deficit and the decline in the surplus of the 
current account. Household consumption is negatively affected. It is worth noting that 
although both the share of export-import gap to GDP and that of the budget deficit to GDP 
are the same in both Scenarios 5 and 6, the two gaps differ significantly in terms of nominal 
and real percentage change as highlighted in table 8. 
As regards household consumption, one of the key findings of the CGE simulations is that 
                                                       
7 Paddy rice is a non-tradable commodity that is not demanded for final consumption. It is demanded as an 
intermediate input by a number of sectors and is an essential input in processed rice, representing 29% of its 





urban and rural household consumption which would fall significantly under no policy 
Scenario 1 would be further depressed by most of the considered policy responses (Figure 
3). Scenarios 3 and 4 are constructed on the assumption that consumption losses resulting 
from the price shock of Scenario 1 for the two poorest quintiles are exactly compensated for. 
This comes at a cost of deeper consumption losses of better-off households. Among rural 
households, the three upper quintiles need to cut their consumption by a further 3 
percentage points in addition to around 1.5% initial consumption loss due to the price shock. 
It is only in Scenario 5 (elimination of import tariffs) that some of the initial consumption 
losses are compensated for by policy action. This effect is almost flat among different 
quintiles. 
 
Figure 3. Egypt: Real per capita consumption by quintiles under different policy 
scenarios: percentage point changes relative to Scenario 1 (no policy) 
 
Panel A. Urban households        Panel B. Rural households 
   
Note: For definition of scenarios see Table 8. The values shown are differences between percentage changes in 
household consumption change under a given policy scenario and under no policy Scenario 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the CGE model. 
 
 
7.2 Sectoral impacts for Egypt 
 
As a result of a strong increase in prices of agri-food products (Scenario 1), composite output 
prices increase in all sectors except for subsidized food products which are assumed to be 
fixed. On the one hand, this induces an increase in total output of non-subsidized items, 
while on the other hand it results in a decline in household demand for those products. Such 
sectors respond to lower domestic demand and higher export supply prices by shifting some 
of their output to exports. Households’ demand for subsidized food products increases as 
their relative prices decline. Yet, their domestic production falls due to rising intermediate 


























Results of CGE simulations 
The increase in export supply price leading to a decline in private real consumption for many 
non-subsidized commodities drives up exports of a number of such commodities. Non-
subsidized rice exports show the highest increase due to the significant rise in its world price 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Egypt: Real export growth rates under Scenario 1 (%) 
64.2
85.3
















7.3 Poverty implications for Egypt 
 
In order to link the CGE model with the micro-simulation framework, a top-down approach is 
adopted.
8 This approach uses the two frameworks in a sequential way. In the first phase, the 
standard CGE model is solved and the impact of different scenarios on real income and 
consumption of different sectors are derived. Consumers have linear expenditure system 
(LES) preferences and hence changes in real consumption reflect the impact of price 
changes as well as changes in consumption patterns (as households may be able to reduce 
the impact of price changes by substituting away from expensive sectors or using cheaper 
alternatives). Changes of different sources of income are also obtained. In the second phase 
for each household covered by the 2008/09 household survey, and for each scenario, 
household consumption on different goods and services as well as its real income are 
adjusted according to the CGE simulation results. Then, real income effect, poverty and 
inequality measures are calculated using the adjusted data sets. 
Increases in world food prices are expected to have a noticeable impact on poverty. The 
poverty rate would increase from 21.6% in baseline to 22.8% in Scenario 1.  Given that 
poverty in Egypt is shallow and many households are clustered just above the poverty line, 
any decline of consumption of households at the lower distribution ladder may result in a 
significant increase in poverty. In Scenarios 3 and 4 subsidies coupled with compensation of 
the two poorest quintiles for consumption losses result in slightly lower poverty rates than 
under Scenario 1. For example, in Scenario 3 the poverty rate falls to 22.4%. 
 
 
                                                       
8 The top-down approach completely disregards the possible feedback effects coming from the microeconomic 
side of the economy, which could affect the macroeconomic variables as well. 





Figure 6. Egypt: Changes in poverty rate, poverty gap and Gini coefficient; Difference 
between Scenarios 3-6 and Scenario 1 
Panel A. Poverty rate changes (% points)  Panel B. Poverty gap changes (% points) 
   
Panel C. Gini coefficient changes 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CGE simulations and HIECS 2008/09. 
Finally, the poverty gap
9 index also deteriorates compared to the actual poverty gap. The 
food price shock (Scenario 1) results in an increase in poverty gap from 4.1% to 4.43%. 
Overall, three out of four analysed policy scenarios improve both the poverty headcount as 
well as poverty gap outcomes relative to the no policy alternative (Scenario 1). Scenario 6 
(rice export ban) worsens the situation with both poverty rate and gap increasing even 
further.  
 
The inequality measures (Gini coefficient
10 and Theil measure
11), minimally decline 
                                                       
9 The poverty gap is given by the mean distance of the poor below the poverty line, as a percentage share of this 
line. The non-poor population enters the calculations with a zero poverty gap.  
10 This is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1. A 
low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income, expenditure or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient 
indicates more unequal distribution. 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income, 
expenditure or wealth) and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, expenditure 





(indicating a more equal distribution) under Scenario 1 (no policy reaction) relative to the 
benchmark. This is driven by the fact that more affluent households exhibit relatively larger 
consumption losses. Such results are typical for Egypt where general declines in real 
consumption are usually accompanied by falling inequality indices. Among the analysed 
policy scenarios, Scenarios 3-4 (with compensations for the poorest quintiles) exhibit 
significant improvements in inequality while for the other two there is almost no change 
reflecting very similar consumption changes for all quintiles. 
 
7.4 Macro implications for Ukraine 
 
Table 9 presents the results of policy simulations for Ukraine. Scenarios 1 and 2 are the 
same as those used in the case of Egypt, i.e. increases in food prices with no policy 
interventions. Then we compare them with two policy scenarios that are very similar to the 
Egyptian ones i.e. tariff elimination (5U) and an export ban (6U). The difference in specific 
parameters of these scenarios between Egypt and Ukraine stems from different trade and 
tariff structures.  
 
The impact on all macro variables with no policy response is proportionate to the increase in 
agricultural and food product prices. As can be expected, the impact is more pronounced in 
the high price increases scenario (Scenario 1). With no policy response a high increase in 
prices is predicted to dent real absorption by 4.5%, reduce real household consumption by 
the same relative amount and lead to a significant drop in real investment (-7.8%). Real 
exports are expected to fall by 12.5% and imports by 7.6%. The real exchange rate is 
expected to appreciate by 2% with the terms of trade deteriorating by 1.5%. Further, 
investment and government savings as a share of GDP decrease by around 1%, while 
private savings increase slightly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
11 The Theil index is part of a larger family of measures of inequality referred to as the General Entropy class. It 
shows the difference between maximum ‘entropy’ (perfect equality) and the actually measured ‘entropy’ (caused 





The results displayed in columns (2) and (3) show the net impact of scenarios with trade 
policy changes i.e. difference between the implications of the two scenarios with trade policy 
changes and Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. An export ban leads to even deeper fall in real 
absorption, household consumption and investment. The real exchange rate depreciates and 
leads to the expansion of exports of products not covered by the ban, so that the total fall of 
exports is smaller than under Scenario 1. On the other hand imports fall further. The 
elimination of tariffs allows for the attenuation of negative impact of increases in food prices. 
However, due to the fact that Ukraine is a net exporter of food and that import tariffs are not 
that high, the positive impact is rather small. As a result of tariff removal the real household 
consumption falls by 0.6 percentage points less than in the benchmark, while exports and 
imports fall slightly less in real terms too. Hence looking only at macro indicators we 
conclude that overall export ban aggravates the impact of agricultural and food product price 
increases, while elimination of tariffs attenuates its impact on real household consumption 
and other main macro indicators. Next we turn to the analysis of the impact of various 
scenarios on rural and urban households. 
 





Table 9. Ukraine: Macroeconomic results of CGE simulations. 
  STRONG PRICE INCREASES  MODERATE PRICE INCREASES 
















  % change  % points change 
relative to (1) 
% change  % points change 
relative to (4) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Real absorption  -4.5  -1.2  0.4  -2.9  -0.9  0.4 
Real HH 
consumption 
-4.5  -1  0.6  -2.9  -0.7  0.6 
Real investment  -7.8  -2.8  0.1  -5.1  -2  0.1 
Real government 
consumption 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total exports  -12.5  5  0.6  -5.9  1.7  0.6 
Total imports  -7.6  -0.9  0.5  -5  -0.5  0.5 
Real exchange rate  -2  4  0.1  0.2  1  0.1 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
-7.2  6.8  0.3  -2.8  3.5  0.3 
CPI 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Terms of trade  -1.5  -6.7  0  -1  -5.6  0 
Investment share of 
GDP 
-1.1 -0.2  0  -0.7  -0.1  0 
Private savings 
share of GDP 
0.3  -0.1  0  0.1  0  0.1 
Foreign savings 
share of GDP 
0 0.1  0  0  0.1  0 
Trade Deficit share 
of GDP 
0  0.2  -0.2  0  0.2  -0.2 
Gov’t Savings share 
of GDP 
-1.3 -0.2  0  -0.8  -0.2  0 
Tariff Revenue share 
of GDP 
0  0  -0.2  0  0  -0.2 
Direct Tax Revenue 
share of GDP 
0.4 -0.2  0  0.2  -0.1  0 
Source: CGE model simulations. 
 
The impact of increases in food prices on household consumption is quite significant as 
evident from Table 10. The fall in consumption in middle urban households reaches up to 
6.6% in Scenario 1. Among rural households consumption of the two poorest quintiles is hit 
hardest with the registered fall of around 2.5%. 
 
An export ban naturally leads to the deterioration of real consumption of rural quintiles, which 
are not able to sell their products abroad and are forced to scale down their production. This 
time the richest households are hit hardest as they are the main exporters of agri-food 
products. On the other hand the net impact on most urban households is positive, as their 





because urban households are benefiting from lower domestic prices as compared to 
Scenario 1, while not losing any income from sales of agri-food products as do rural 
households. 
 
Finally, the elimination of tariffs on agri-food products leads to an improvement of welfare of 
all households relative to the benchmark. All consumers now enjoy lower domestic prices of 
agri-food products, with rural households benefiting a little more than urban households due 
to the higher share of imported agri-food products in consumption. 
 
Table 10. Ukraine: Change in real consumption (in %) in rural and urban household 
quintiles 
  STRONG PRICE INCREASES  MODERATE PRICE INCREASES 
  No policy 
response  





  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
  % change  % point change relative to 
(1) 
% change  % point change relative to 
(4) 
HURBQ1 -4.6  1.3  0.4  -2.6  0.7  0.4 
HURBQ2  -5.9  1.7  0.4  -3.3  0.8  0.4 
HURBQ3 -6.6  1.8  0.5  -3.7  0.9  0.5 
HURBQ4  -6.1  0.8  0.5  -3.6  0.3  0.5 
HURBQ5  -4.7 -1.1  0.5  -3.1  -0.7 0.6 
HRURQ1  -2.4  -2.5  0.6  -1.6  -1.9  0.6 
HRURQ2 -2.5  -2.8  0.6  -1.7  -2  0.6 
HRURQ3  -1.8  -3.9  0.7  -1.5  -2.7  0.6 
HRURQ4  -1.1 -5.4  0.7  -1.4  -3.4 0.7 
HRURQ5  -0.5  -6.1  0.8  -1.1  -3.9  0.7 
TOTAL  -4.5 -1  0.6  -2.9  -0.7 0.6 
 Source: CGE model simulations. 





7.5 Sectoral impact for Ukraine 
 
Increases in prices of agri-food products are expected to lead to expansion of production of 
these sectors proportionately to the increases in prices. Hence, in Scenario 1 the production 
of other crops is expected to increase by 80%, production of oil crops by 53% and production 
of edible oil by 45%. The increased profitability of these sectors would lead to a shift of 
factors of production away from other manufacturing and service sectors which then record 
falling output. 
 
In the case of ban on total exports of selected sectors: wheat, other crops, oil crops and 
edible oils, the production of these sectors drops dramatically, while the expansion of several 
remaining agri-food sectors is even more pronounced. With the release of productive 
resources some sectors (e.g. hotels and restaurants) grow in this scenario, while the 
production fall of other sectors is less pronounced. Finally, in the case of elimination of tariffs 
the impact on production is rather limited, but the majority of sectors fare slightly better than 
under the benchmark (i.e. Scenarios 1 or 2). A slightly higher total demand allows for a 
slightly less negative impact on the production of all sectors, but the benchmark pattern of 
the expansion of production of agri-food products dominates the results.  
 
The implications of various scenarios for exports and imports are in line with the production 
changes. In the benchmark scenario exports of agri-food products expand significantly. This 
effect is eliminated in the case of sectors on which an export ban is imposed. On the other 
hand the elimination of tariffs leads to the expansion of imports of agri-food products.  
 
Table 11. Ukraine: Percentage change in production following increases in prices of 
agri-food products 
  STRONG PRICE INCREASES  MODERATE PRICE INCREASES 








Export ban   Zero tariffs 
  % change  % change relative to 
benchmark 
% change  % change relative to 
benchmark 
Wheat  17.1  -30.1  -0.5  39.5  -52.2  -0.2 
Paddy rice  20.4  -4.6  -8.5  0  0  0 





  STRONG PRICE INCREASES  MODERATE PRICE INCREASES 








Export ban   Zero tariffs 
  % change  % change relative to 
benchmark 
% change  % change relative to 
benchmark 
Oil crops  53.1  -90.1  1.4 30.5  -67.9  0.6 
Vegetables & 
fruits 
-11.1  13.8  0.2  -5.2  8  0.2 
Sugar crops  -7.3  2.5  0.3  -4.1  1.1  0.3 
Other 
agriculture 
30.8  33.9  1.3  16.2  9.8  0.9 
Crude oil  -2.4  7.8  0.4  -1.4  4.2  0.4 
Meat  11.2  3.7  1  5.8  -0.1  0.8 
Edible oil  44.8  -74  2.9 23.3  -52.5  1.8 
Other animal 
products 
5.3  2.5  0.6  2.5  0.7  0.5 
Processed rice  11.5  0.2  1.4  2  -2.1  1 
Sugar  -3.6  -1.1  0.9  -2.1  -1.5  0.9 
Bread -5.7  -4.3  2.3  -1.2  -6.1  2.4 
Other food  -6.1  0.3  1.2  -2.8  -1.4  1.1 
Beverages & 
tobacco 
-5.8 -0.2  0.9  -3.3  -0.7  0.9 
Textile and 
leather 
-11.5  7.9  0.8  -5.2  4.1  0.7 
Chemicals & 
petroleum 
-25.4 1.3 0.3  -16.2 1.1  0.3 
Construction & 
electricity 
-8.9  0.3  0.2  -5.2  -0.1  0.2 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
-12.9 15.9  0.9  -4.6 8.5  0.9 
Transport & 
communications 
-9.4  8.3  0.4  -4  4.6  0.4 
Other industries  -18.2  12.3 0.4  -8.7  7.3  0.4 
Other services  -3  1.3  0.2  -1.5  0.5  0.2 
TOTAL -7  2.5  0.4  -3.7  1.2  0.4 
Source: CGE model simulations. 





7.6 Poverty implications for Ukraine 
 
In the case of Ukraine, the calculations underlying the poverty analysis are simplified. We 
linearly extrapolate the income and expenditure data by quintiles and also use linearly 
extrapolated patterns of changes in income and expenditure results obtained from the CGE 
model. Table 12 reports the calculated effects of scenarios on the poverty rate. In order to 
improve robustness of the results, different poverty lines were used, corresponding to initial 
poverty rates of 10%, 20% and 30% and the results reported in the table are the average 
across these different options. Such poverty lines and rates are consistent with the range 
used in recent analyses of this subject (World Bank, 2007).  
 
Table 12. Poverty rate changes in Ukraine under different scenarios (% points)  
  STRONG PRICE INCREASES  MODERATE PRICE INCREASES 
  No policy 
response  




Export ban   Zero 
tariffs 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6) 
  % point 
change 
% point change relative 
to (1) 
% point change  % point change 
relative to (4) 
Rural 
poverty 
1.2 1.4  -0.3  0.8  0.9  -0.3 
Urban 
poverty 
1.6  -0.4  -0.1  0.9  -0.2  -0.1 
 Source: Simulations based on CGE model results. 
 
The results can be summarised as follows. Without a policy reaction to negative food price 
shocks, urban poverty increases somewhat stronger than does rural poverty. This effect is 
more pronounced under more severe price shocks. An export ban has the potential to slightly 
reduce the urban poverty rate but at the cost of quite a significant increase in rural poverty. 
The magnitude of the latter effect is similar to the original shock. In other words, an export 
ban roughly doubles the original negative impact on rural poverty. The elimination of tariffs 
on agri-food products leads to a small reduction of the poverty rate. This limited poverty-
reducing effect is stronger among rural households.  
 









The analysis presented in this paper shows the magnitude and certain features of the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic effects likely to arise from the sustained food price 
shock of the magnitude up to the one observed during the period of 2006-2008. While this 
particular historical surge of global food prices has been partly reversed since then, a future 
occurrence of a shock similar in scope but more persistent cannot be excluded. Also, the 
results remain potentially relevant from the policy perspective even in case of stabilisation of 
global food prices. 
 
The analysis covered in detail two countries that share some common characteristics (size, 
level of development) but differ in some important aspects. Specifically, while Egypt is a large 
net importer of agricultural products with a developed system of food consumption subsidies, 
Ukraine is a net agricultural exporter with a somewhat more developed system of food 
production subsidies. 
 
The macroeconomic effects of an external food price shock of the analysed magnitude 
(without any policy actions) can be quite pronounced. Estimated consumer price index or 
nominal exchange rate adjustments are of the order of several percentage points in both 
countries. Significant adjustment takes place through the foreign trade channel with Egypt’s 
pre-shock current account surplus almost disappearing. On the other hand in Ukraine a high 
increase in prices is predicted to decrease real absorption by 4.5% and lead to a significant 
drop in real investment (-7.8%). Real exports were expected to fall by 12.5% and imports by 
7.6%. The real exchange rate was expected to appreciate by 2% with the terms of trade 
deteriorating by 1.5%. 
  
Household consumption is affected negatively in both countries – by close to 2% in real 
terms in Egypt and 4.5% in Ukraine in the case of the strong price increase scenario. Urban 
households suffer bigger losses in both countries – the difference between rural and urban 
outcomes is more pronounced in Ukraine. This is associated with a visible rise in poverty 
levels (for a range of different definitions of poverty). 
 





is the limited ability of the policies to reduce the negative social consequences and a rise in 
poverty. The results for Egypt suggest that most policy interventions have a dampening 
effect on household consumption across the income distribution range. The only exception is 
a scenario in which food import tariffs are cut. Also, the scenarios assuming that the two 
poorest quintiles can be perfectly compensated in cash for the losses incurred due to 
elimination of food subsidies by definition imply maintaining the level of consumption of this 
group of households. To what extent such a policy could be executed in practise is not clear. 
Similarly in Ukraine, the elimination of import tariffs on food products improves the real 
consumption of households, while an export ban slightly improves the situation of rural 
households at the expense of the urban population suffering significant additional 
consumption losses due to surging food prices. The poverty implications of these policy 
alternatives are similar with food import tariff eliminations slightly improving the poverty 
situation in both Egypt and Ukraine. In Egypt, theoretical scenarios assuming perfect 
compensation of the two poorest quintiles also naturally improve poverty outcomes. 
 
Summing up, the CGE modelling exercises illustrate the severity of the shock, and 
inadequacy of several policy options suggesting cuts in food import tariffs as a partial 
remedy. Yet, it is also clear that from the analysis that in the case of Egypt maintaining the 
food subsidy scheme intact is not sustainable from a fiscal perspective. The policy scenarios 
analysed in the CGE models are quite stylised and their practical implementation would be 
very difficult. It is therefore important to discuss the practical policy-relevant conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
The Egyptian system of food subsidies needs to be reformed with the objective of making it 
less costly for the budget and better targeted at the poor. This implies that leakage to better 
off households should be limited. Several elements could be considered here.  
 
One general direction of change could be a gradual switch from subsidising final products to 
direct support to farmers to allow them to better cope with the fluctuations of international 
food prices. A system of guaranteed prices for strategic crops could be considered. 
Alternatively, a system of insurance against price shocks could be introduced. Direct 
subsidies to farmers conditional on their adoption of good practices such as modern irrigation 
and balanced fertilization might prove effective. With regard to the organisation of the market 
measures to reduce non-competitive practices by traders regarding food storage, distribution 






Reducing the fiscal burden of food subsidies while maintaining their poverty-alleviation role 
could involve geographical targeting of eligible households. As 78 percent of the poor in 
Egypt are concentrated in rural areas (World Bank 2009b), proxy means testing combined 
with poverty mapping would help identify the most vulnerable groups, reduce errors of 
inclusion (of least vulnerable groups) and errors of exclusion (of vulnerable households). 
Direct cash transfers to the poorest households instead of food subsidies could then be 
implemented. In a similar vein, certain types of support could be targeted only at the poorest 
farmers (instead of subsidised agricultural inputs) avoiding dual prices distorting markets and 
leading to misallocation of resources. The baladi bread distribution system could be made 
more efficient if a separation between baladi bread production and distribution process was 
implemented. Providing direct cash transfers to the poorest households instead of food 
subsidies and to the poorest farmers instead of agricultural inputs could eliminate dual 
market pricing which results in distortions and misallocation of resources. 
 
Some more specific points worth mentioning include: 
 
•  Enhancing the efficiency of baladi bread production and distribution. Some relative 
simple approaches could be taken here: improving wheat storage and the bread 
production technique through public-private partnerships; easing access to financing 
that would allow bakeries to invest in new equipment, train their workers and more 
effectively implement health and environmental standards. Also, better supervision of 
all marketing stages and imposing financial fines to avoid leakages in subsidized flour 
and bread might be considered. 
 
•  Improving the ration card system by facilitating the registration for truly needy 
households that are currently outside the system, eliminating or reducing subsidies 
on tea and sugar, considering special allowances for certain categories of households 
(e.g. a quota of nutritious powdered milk can be offered to households with children) 
and introducing flexibility to the commodity mix available allowing individual 
adjustment to tastes and preferences. The currently being piloted electronic smart 
card system could be instrumental in improving the system. 
  
In Ukraine, there are potentially interesting lessons to be taken from an attempt of some 





poorest. The breakdown of these reforms due to local budget constraints in the wake of the 
financial and economic crises, i.e. when it was needed the most, suggests that a more crisis-
robust scheme might be needed. The new scheme does not necessarily need to lead to a 
larger involvement by the government responsible for implementation and financing, but 
stronger guarantees of the functioning of the new system might be needed to win public 
support for elimination of the provision of subsidised bread. 
 
 








Aboulenein, Soheir, Heba El Laithy, Omneia Helmy, Hanaa Kheir-El-Din, Liudmyla 
Kotusenko, Maryla Maliszewska, Dina Mandour and Wojciech Paczyński (2010), Global food 
price shock and the poor in Egypt and Ukraine - a comparison of impacts and policy options, 
FEMISE Research no. FEM33-14. Available at www.femise.org. 
Baker, Marcia Merry and Ramtanu Maitra (2008), Egypt can attain food sufficiency once 
WTO globalization is shut down, Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), at: www. 
Larouchepub.com/eir/public/2008, July 18. 
Brown, Judith. E. (1991), Everywoman's guide to nutrition, University of Minnesota Press.  
Bureau, Jean-Christophe and Alan Matthews (2005), “EU Agricultural Policy: What 
Developing Countries Need to Know”, IIIS Discussion Paper No. 91. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=922068 
Cranfield, J. A. L., Paul V Preckel, and Thomas W Hertel (2007), "Poverty analysis using an 
international cross-country demand system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4285, 
The World Bank. 
Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson (1982), General Equilibrium Models 
for Development Policy, a World Bank Research Publication, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ecorys and CASE-Ukraine (2007), “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for the FTA 
between the EU and Ukraine within the Enhanced Agreement”, report for European 
Commission, DG TRADE, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/november/tradoc_136856.pdf.  
FAO (2008), “The state of food insecurity in the world, 2008 - High food prices and food 
security - threats and opportunities”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
FAO (2009a), “The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets: High food prices and the food 






FAO (2009b), “Arab Republic of Egypt, Initiative on Soaring Food Prices, Macro-Economic 
and Poverty Situation”, Working Paper 1, February, Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations.  
Ghoneim Ahmed (2008), Can Trade Policy Save Egypt from the World Food Crisis? Mimeo, 
paper submitted to Social Contract Center Project. 
Helmy, Omneia (2005), “The efficiency and equity of subsidy policy in Egypt”, Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies (ECES) Working Paper, no. 105 (in Arabic). 
Helmy, Omneia (2008), Price Subsidy or Building Capacities in Egypt, ECES Policy 
Viewpoint no. 21, The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, July (in Arabic). 
ICPS (2007), "Free Trade between Ukraine and the EU: An impact assessment", 
International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev. 
IFPRI (2008), “Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor”, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, December. 
Industrial Modernization Center (2007), “Egypt Agricultural Export Strategy Final Report”, 
Cairo, April. 
Kheir El-Din, Hanaa, Tarek Abdelfattah Moursi, and Nihal El-Magherbel (1996), 
“Macroeconomic and Sectoral Effects of Trade Policies in Egypt: A General Equilibrium 
Approach”, Paper presented at the Conference of the Economics Department, Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, January. 
Löfgren, Hans (2001), "Less Poverty in Egypt Explorations of Alternative Pasts with Lessons 
for the Future", Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research 
Institute. Available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/tmd/dp/tmdp72.htm. 
Löfgren, Hans and Moataz El-Saïd (1999), "A General Equilibrium Analysis of Alternative 
Scenarios for Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt”, Trade and Macroeconomics Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/general-equilibrium-analysis-alternative-scenarios-food-





Löfgren, Hans, Rebecca Lee Harris and Sherman Robinson (2002),” A standard computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model in GAMS”, Technical Guide: Microcomputers in policy 
research, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
National Democratic Party (2008) “Investment and Employment”, The NDP Fifth Annual 
Conference in Cairo, November. 
Piętka-Kosińska, Katarzyna (ed.) (2009), “Agriculture Income Assessment for the Purpose of 
Social Assistance: the Case of Ukraine”, CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 399.  
Ravnskov, Uffe (2005), Dietary fat is not the villain, British Medical Journal, Rapid response 
to Zatonski and Willett (2005), http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/331/7510/187.  
UNDP (2008), Food Security and Agriculture in Arab Countries: Facts, Challenges and Policy 
Considerations, United Nations Development Program, League of Arab States. 
USDA (2008), Egypt Grain and Feed- Egypt Officially Suspends Rice Exports, Global 
Agriculture Information Network- GAIN Report Number: EG8006- July. 
USDA (2009), Agricultural Economy and Policy Report- Egypt - Global Insight 2007, 
February.  
WASDE (2010), World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, WASDE – 480, 10 
March, United States Department of Agriculture. 
World Bank (2007), Ukraine: Poverty Update, Report No. 39887.  
World Bank (2008), Competitive agriculture or state control: Ukraine's response to the global 
food crisis, policy note available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUKRAINE/Resources/WorldFoodCrisisandRoleofUkrai
ne.pdf. 
World Bank (2009a), Global economic prospects. Commodities at the crossroads, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank (2009b), Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Social Mobility in Egypt 
between 2005 and 2008. Draft Policy Note. 





Survey”, October, Word Food Program. 
Zatonski WA, Willett W. (2005), “Changes in dietary fat and declining coronary heart disease 
in Poland: population based study”, British Medical Journal; 331: 187-8. 







CGE model for Egypt 
The computable general equilibrium model designed for this study is based on a class of 
CGE models that has been extensively applied to developing countries to study the impact of 
different policies on growth, economic structure and performance, and income distribution. In 
particular, the model draws on the work of Dervis et al (1982), Lofgren (2001), Lofgren and El 
Saïd (1999) and Kheir-El-Din et al (1996). 
Model Basic Structure 
The core model is basically neoclassical; however, it includes some structuralist features that 
depart from the Walrasian paradigm providing a better representation of the Egyptian 
economy. Such features include the assumption of mark-up-pricing for subsidized food 
products and accordingly fixed domestic prices for such products. The model also assumes 
imperfect substitutability between goods traded internationally and domestic output. 
Structuralist features extend to the factors’ markets where existence of wage rigidities and 
immobility of capital and land are assumed. Regarding labour, the nominal wage rate is 
assumed to be determined exogenously according to institutional mechanisms. This 
corresponds to the Keynesian assumption of short-run predetermined nominal wages 
implying the presence of involuntary unemployment. Thus, the model deviates from the 
neoclassical full employment assumption and allows for the presence of unemployment 
which is a major feature characterizing labour markets in Egypt. National Keynesian 
unemployment is endogenously determined as the difference between the aggregate labour 
demand from activities and from the exogenously given aggregate labour supply. Due to the 
assumption of perfect labour mobility and the fact that most of the unemployed workers in 
Egypt are new entrants to the market and therefore cannot be assigned to any sector, the 
model does not solve for sectoral unemployment rates and determines only the national rate 
of unemployment (Kheir-El-Din et al. 1996).  
Capital and land stocks are assumed to be sectorally fixed implying factor immobility. This 
assumption is compatible with the short-run nature of the model where capital may be 
regarded to be less mobile than labour (Dervis et al. 1982). Further, immobility implies that 
rental rates will differ across sectors reflecting the fact that capital is heterogeneous i.e. a unit 





full utilization with flexible rental rates. Due to market forces, rental rates are determined 
endogenously in each sector. However, the neoclassical assumption regarding all factors to 
be paid according to their marginal productivity is retained. Incorporating both neoclassical 
and structuralist characteristics allows the model to be classified as a “Neoclassical -
Structuralist” model. 
The model is of a short-run nature implying that the results of the comparative static analysis 
experiments may be interpreted as a relatively short-run equilibrium effects to an exogenous 
policy change. Regarding its time dimension, the model is static. It solves equilibrium values 
in one period. For each period it generates a set of relative prices of commodities and factors 
that equate supply and demand in the corresponding markets. The model also allows for the 
determination of consumer price index indicating inflation.  
Social Accounting Matrix as data base for the model 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Egypt for 2006/2007 was constructed as data base for 
the model. An updated input-output table was estimated for this year on the basis of the 
input-output table for 2002/2003, which was constructed at the Ministry of State for Economic 
Development (MOED). This table consists of 22 sectors producing goods and services. 
The updated table was adjusted to conform to the objectives of the study, therefore more 
details on production and consumption of food were included and non-food manufactured 
















Table (A1.1): Disaggregation of factors, institutions and activities 
Actors Elements 
3 Factors of production  Labour, Capital and Land 
Wheat, paddy rice, maize, other crops, oil crops, vegetables 
and fruits, sugar crops, bovine, chicken and other meat. 
Subsidized bread, subsidized flour, other subsidized food 
products (including subsidized processed rice, edible oil, and 
sugar), non-subsidized rice, non-subsidized processed food.  
Crude oil and extractions, beverages and tobacco, textiles, 
chemicals and petroleum products, other industries. 










Construction and electricity, hotels and restaurants, 
transportation and communication and other services. 
13 Institutions:  10 households (rural and urban disaggregated by quintile), 
companies, government and Rest of the world. 
 
Characteristics of food products as modelled in the 2006/07 SAM are highlighted in Table 
A1.2. 
Table (A1.2): Characteristics of food products according to SAM 2006/07 
Characteristics No  private 
consumption 
No imports  No exports  No imports no 
exports (non-
tradable) 
Sectors  Paddy rice, sugar 
crops, oil crops 
and crude oil 
















Economic decision making is modelled as an outcome of decentralized optimization by 
producers and consumers. Concerning production, producers (activities) are assumed to 
maximize their profits subject to technological constraints. Technology in each sector is 





factors: labour, land and capital. Like most CGE models, intermediate input demands are 
modelled as fixed input-output technology (Leontief function). Table (A1.3) presents the main 
features of the model. 
Table (A1.3): Model Features 
Feature Treatment 
Time  frame  Static with updating specific exogenous variables 
and parameters to be solved in various years other 
than the base year 
Theoretical basis  Neo-classical structuralist 
Production technology  Primary factors: CES 
Intermediate inputs: Leontief functions 
Household consumption demand  LES (Linear expenditure system) 
International prices  Exogenous 
Import demand  Endogenous (through CES domestic supply function)
Export supply   Endogenous (through CET production function) 
Export demand  Downward sloping 
Export transformability and import 
substitution  
Imperfect 
Land and capital  Fixed supply with endogenous rental rates 
Labour  Fixed wages with endogenous national 
unemployment rate 
 
Finally, a set of macro equilibrium conditions are imposed to close the model. They present 
the closure rules of the model or the system constraints that the whole economy must satisfy. 
For each market a variable should be specified through which its’ movements equilibrium is 
brought between the supply and demand sides. These are divided into nominal and real 
system constraints. Nominal constraints cover markets for commodities and factors of 
production whereas real ones refer to government, rest of the world and savings-investment 
accounts. 
For all commodities, price flexibility achieves equilibrium in each market. However, imports 





food products prices are assumed to be fixed and mark-up pricing serves to clear the market. 
In the case of imports, supply is infinitely elastic at fixed world import prices. The quantity 
supplied adjusts to equal the quantity demanded. Therefore, imports’ domestic market is the 
only market that clears through quantity adjustment. 
Market equilibrium for immobile factors of production (land and capital) is achieved through 
changes in their relevant prices. In the labour market, existence of Keynesian unemployment 
is assumed. Fixed labour supply is set to be equal to the sum of sectoral labour demand, 
fixed government labour demand and unemployment. The national level of unemployment 
serves to achieve equilibrium in the labour market in the sense of equating national fixed 
labour supply with aggregate labour demand. 
Table (A1.4) summarizes the way in which real and nominal constraints in the model are 
brought into balance. For example, the balance between savings and investment is achieved 
by setting total investment to be equal to the sum of domestic and foreign savings. This 
means that total savings determine the level of investment in the model. Moreover, foreign 
savings endogenous variations are assumed to achieve the balance of the current account 
given the assumption of fixed nominal exchange rate. 
Table (A1.4): Closure rules 
Constraint Equilibrating  variable 
Goods markets (perfect competition)  Prices (except for the domestic output of subsidized food 
where equilibrium is reached via variations in the mark-
up pricing variable and imports where the market adjusts 
through changes in the quantity supplied). 
Factor markets  Capital and land: prices (full employment) 
Labour: national unemployment rate 
Government account  Government savings  
Current account  Foreign savings 
Savings-investment Investment (savings driven model) 
 